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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Jockumsen has challenged on appeal the district court's improper reliance
on information obtained during the course of competency evaluations of the defendant
at sentencing, and improper inclusion of information from his competency evaluations in
the presentence investigation report materials.

In addition, Mr. Jockumsen has

challenged the district court's failure to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to
I.C.R. 32 and I.C. 19-2522 for purpose of sentencing.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address some of the State's contentions on
appeal. While the State has argued that Mr. Jockumsen's assertion of a violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination was waived because this issue was not
raised before the district court, it is well-established that a violation of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination is a fundamental error that can be raised for
the first time on appeal. In addition, Mr. Jockumsen's claims regarding the district
court's improper use of the competency evaluation materials at sentencing are
justiciable for the first time on appeal as an abuse of the court's discretion because the
district court's actions were in contravention of clearly applicable legal standards.
These legal standards at sentencing include the statutory grant of immunity provided in
I.C. § 18-215.
This brief is also necessary to address the State's interpretation of the provisions
of I.C.

3 18-215. In particular, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that the scope of

this statute extends to any of the statements made by the defendant in the course of
producing the evaluation itself, not just to statements made for the purpose of treatment.

Also, the State misinterprets the meaning of the term, "impeachment," as that phrase is
used in the statute.
Finally, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that pertinent case law has
previously considered, and rejected, the State's suggestion that the manifest disregard
standard, as applied to the failure to sua sponfe order a mental health evaluation, is
limited to a consideration of I.C.R. 32 to the exclusion of the statutory mandates
contained in I.C. § 19-2522. To the contrary, this Court has repeatedly held that the
provisions of I.C. § 19-2522 provide the legal standards governing the court's decision
whether to order a psychological evaluation.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Jockumsen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this
Reply Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1.

Are Mr. Jockumsen's claims regarding the improper use of his competency
evaluations at sentencing justiciable on appeal?

2.

Was the district court's use of Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluation at
sentencing, and inclusion of this report in the Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI), improper under I.C. 3 18-215?

3.

Does the proper standard for review of whether the district court was required to
sua sponfe order a mental hearth evaluation for purposes of sentencing
incorporate the requirements of both I.C.R. 32(d) and I.C. § 19-2522?

ARGUMENT
I,
Mr. Jockumsen's Claims Regardina The Improper Use Of His Competencv Evaluations
At Sentencina Are Properly Justiciable On Appeal
A.

Mr. Jockumsen's Assertion That The District Court's Use Of His Competency
Evaluations At Sentencing Violated His Fifth Amendment Riaht Aaainst SeifIncrimination Is Properly Justiciable Bv This Court As A Fundamental Error
The State asserts in its Respondent's Brief that Mr. Jockurnsen's claim of a

violation of his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination was waived
because he failed to object to the district court's use of his competency evaluation
against Mr. Jockumsen at sentencing. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) While defense
counsel appears not to have raised any objection to the district court's admission and
consideration of these materials, in both the PSI and as evidence in making its
sentencing determination, this assertion of error may be properly reviewed by this Court
as it constitutes a fundamental error that can be raised for the first time on appeal.'
Both the ldaho Supreme Court and the ldaho Court of Appeals have held that
violations of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination constitutes
a fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Whife, 97 ldaho 708, 714 n.8, 551 P.2d 1344, 1350 (1976); State v. Timmons, 145
ldaho 279, 178 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2007); Stafe v. Kerchusky, 138 ldaho 671, 678, 67
The State correctly notes in its Respondent's Brief that the issue of fundamental error
was not raised in the initial Appellant's Brief. However, pursuant to l.A.R.35(c), a reply
brief, "may contain additional argument in rebuttal to the contentions of the respondent."
I.A.R. 35(c). Because the justiciability of the Fifth Amendment issue was raised by the
State in its Respondent's Brief, Mr. Jockumsen may properly rebut the State's
contention in this Reply Brief.

P.3d 1283, 1290 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Poland, 116 ldaho 34, 36, 773 P.2d 651, 653
(Ct. App. 1989). In addition, while the State attempts to cast the failure of defense
counsel to object as a strategic decision, the Court in White makes clear that the
"inference of strategic by-passing of constitutional objections occurs only when there is
strong indication that counsel knew of the potential objection and chose to ignore it."
White, 97 ldaho at 714 n.8, 551 P.2d at 1350. Here, there is no clear record that
defense counsel knew of the Fifth Amendment violation incurred by the district court's
use of Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluations at sentencing and by the inclusion of
this material in his PSI.
B.

Mr. Jockumsen Did Not Waive His Riqht To Assert His Fifth Amendment Riuhts
Durinu The Course Of His Competency Evaluations Because Mr. Jockumsen Did
Not Have The Riqht To Invoke His Fifth Amendment Riuhts At That Stage Of The
Proceedinqs
The State asserts that Mr. Jockumsen waived his right to assert his Fifth

Amendment protection against self-incrimination by participating in the competency
evaluation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-12.) However, the State's argument is unavailing
because, at the time he participated in the competency proceedings, Mr. Jockumsen
was operating under a grant of statutory use immunity for his statements pursuant to
I.C. § 18-215, and therefore he could not have invoked his Fifth Amendment rights at
that time.
The Fifth Amendment does not apply to statements that are made pursuant to a
statutory grant of immunity. See, e.g,, Kastigar v. US., 406 U.S. 441, 447 n.13 (1972).
The function of a grant of immunity, as it relates to the privilege against selfincrimination, has been aptly stated by the Court of Appeals in State v. Jones:

When prosecution and conviction are precluded by grant of immunity, the
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. Immunity operates to
"compel testimony over a claim of privilege" against self-incrimination.
Both the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and immunity
statutes protect a witness from future prosecutions.
State v. Jones, 129 ldaho 471, 476, 926 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Ct. App. 1996) (internal
citations omitted).
A legislative act or a court order that precludes the use of statements against the
defendant when made by the defendant under the grant of immunity constitutes "use
immunity." See State v. Pratf, 125 ldaho 546, 560-561, 873 P.2d 800, 814-815 (1993).
While a grant of immunity does not confer additional constitutional rights on the person
making the statement, use immunity prohibits authorities from using the compelled
testimony in any respect, and it therefore ensures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties as a result of the immunized statements or testimony. Id.
at 561, 873 P.2d at 815 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453). Use immunity also applies
"at the sentencing stage of a criminal proceeding." Id.
The statute at issue with regard to the limitations on the use of competency
evaluations falls within the ambit of a use immunity statute. ldaho Code § 18-21'5
provides that:
A statement made by a person subject to psychiatric or psychological
examination pursuant to sections 18-211, 18-212 or 19-2522, ldaho Code,
for purposes of such examination or treatment shall not be admissible into
evidence in any criminal proceeding against him on any issue other than
the defendant's ability to assist counsel at trial or to form any specific
intent which is an element of the crime charged, except that such
statements of a defendant to a psychiatrist or psychologist as are relevant
for purposes of impeachment purposes may be received subject to the
usual rules of evidence governing matters of impeachment.
I.C. 3 18-215.

This statute precludes the use of statements made by the defendant as evidence
against him or her in any criminal proceeding on issues unrelated to competency or the
ability to form the specific intent to commit an offense. As such, this statute constitutes
a statutory grant of use immunity in favor of defendants undergoing competency
evaluations. See Pratt, 125 ldaho at 560-561, 873 P.2d at 814-815. Because the
defendant enjoys statutory immunity for his statements made in the course of the
competency evaluation, Mr. Jockumsen could not have invoked his right to remain silent
because he was already granted the absolute assurance through this statute that his
statements would not be later used against him in a criminal proceeding.
The two cases primarily relied on by the State in support of its claims are
inapposite to the issues at bar because neither of these cases deal with statements
made pursuant to a statutory grant of immunity. The State relies largely on two cases:
State V. Curless, 137 ldaho 138,44 P.3d 1193 (Ct. App. 2002) and Madison v. Craven,
144 ldaho 696, 169 P.3d 284 (Ct. App. 2007). (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-12.) However,
both of these cases arise out of contexts where the defendant's statements were made
with no grant of statutory use immunity, and therefore the defendant could have invoked
his or her Fifth Amendment rights at the time of making the statements.
In Curless, the statements at issue were made during the course of a
psychosexual evaluation ordered for purposes of sentencing. Curless, 137 ldaho at
140-143, 44 P.3d at 1195-1198. The governing statute for such evaluations, I.C. § 188316, expressly provides that, "If ordered by the court, an offender convicted of any
offense listed in section 18-8304, ldaho Code, shall submit to an evaluation to be
completed and submitted to the district court ... for the court's consideration prior to

7

sentencing and incarceration or release on probation." I.C. § 18-8316 (emphasis
added).

Under this language, it is very clear that any statements made during the

course of the evaluation may be used against the defendant at sentencing, and
therefore there is no concomitant immunity for the defendant's statements in such a
hearing. As such, the holding in Curless does not apply.
In the same vein, the portion of the Madison Opinion relied upon by the State
involved statements made by the defendant to the presentence investigator for
purposes of completing the presentence investigation report. Madison, 144 ldaho at
700, 169 P.3d at 288. The fundamental purpose of such reports is to enable the district
court to determine an appropriate sentence. See, e.g., State v. Romero, 116 ldaho 391,
393-394, 775 P.2d 1233, 1235-1236 (1989). Because of this, there is no statutory
immunity against the use of these statements against the defendant at sentencing, and
the Fifth Amendment applies.
Mr. Jockumsen could not have asserted his Fifth Amendment rights during the
course of the competency evaluation because the legislature had granted him statutory
immunity against the use of these statements against him in any criminal proceeding on
any issue other than whether he was competent to stand trial. I.C. 3 18-215. As such,
the State's argument that he should have asserted his Fifth Amendment right during his
competency evaluation is without merit.

C.

Mr. Jockumsen's Assertion That The District Court's Use Of His Competency
Evaluations At Sentencing Constituted An Abuse Of Discretion Bv Failina To
Abide By Legal Standards Attendant To Its Discretion At Sentencinq Is Properly
Justiciable As An Abuse Of The Court's Discretion At Sentencinq Under State V.
It is well-established that the standard that this Court applies to a review of a

sentence on appeal is abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 146 ldaho 378,
384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jafek, 141 ldaho 71, 74-75, 106 P.3d
397, 400-401 (Ct. App. 2005). The three-part test for an abuse of discretion is equally
well-established - this Court will review the district court's sentencing determination for
(1) whether the district court correctly recognized the issue as one of discretion, (2)
whether the court acted within the proper boundaries of that discretion and consistently
with the legal standards that are applicable to the district court's discretionary
determination; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision through the
exercise of reason. Id. It is the second prong of the inquiry that is at stake in this
appeal

- whether

the district court acted in violation of applicable legal standards

attendant to its discretion at sentencing when the court considered evidence from
Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluation in several aspects of its sentencing decision.
The controlling case on this issue, Stafe v. Cope, makes clear that this type of
error falls within the category of an abuse of discretion based upon the failure to follow
legal standards that are applicable to the court's sentencing determinations. As stated
by the Court in Cope:
Ultimately the determination of whether a particular sentence is an abuse
of discretion depends upon the information that is used in framing the
sentence. If a defendant who retains the right to challenge a sentence is
precluded from challenging the use of information that is statutorily
excluded or false or otherwise improper, the right to appeal would be
rendered meaningless

Retention of the right to appeal a sentence is not so limited. It extends to
the underlying information that forms the basis of the sentence.
State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,499, 129 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2006).
Because I.C. § 18-215 extended a statutory grant of immunity to defendants for
all statements made in the course of competency evaluations, and this provision of
statutory immunity extends to sentencing proceedings, this statute placed a clear
prohibition on the power of the district court to inject these materials into evidence at
sentencing. In addition, sentencing determinations are consistently reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, including whether the district court followed applicable law. As
such, the issue of whether the district court acted in contravention of the applicable
provisions of I.C. 3 18-215 at sentencing is properly before this Court.

The District Court's Use Of Mr. Jockumsen's Competency Evaluation At Sentencinq,
And inclusion Of This Report in The Presentence investiqation Report. Was Improper
Under I.C. 6 18-215
As previously noted, the legislature has expressly provided, by statute, for a
defendant to have use immunity regarding the substance of any of his or her remarks
made in the course of a competency evaluation in order to further the accuracy and
efficacy of competency determinations. See I.C. § 18-215. The State has suggested
that this Court should construe the language of this statute to only extend to statements
made "for purposes of examination and treatment."

(Respondent's Brief, p.14.)

However, the State's argument omits a key term from the language of I.C. 9 18-215 that

creates an entirely different meaning with regard to the scope of coverage of this
statute.
ldaho Code

5 18-215 does not apply only to statements made "for purposes of

evaluation and treatment," but instead applies to a "statement made by a person
subjected to a psychiatric or psychological examination or treatment pursuant to
sections 18-211, 18-212, or 19-2522, ldaho Code, for purposes of such examination or
treatment." I.C. § 18-215. The term "such" is an adjective that, in this context, means
"of the character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied." Merriam-Webster
Online Dicfionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/such (site last visited on
9/29/09). "Such examination" would therefore refer back to the prior phrase "psychiatric
or psychological examination." In light of this, the plain language of the statute applies
to any statements that were made during the course of the competency evaluation itself.
The State has further suggested that the district court's use of Mr. Jockumsen's
statements in his competency evaluations, and the opinions of the competency
evaluators based thereupon, were proper as impeachment on the part of the district
court. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) However, this argument is contrary to the ldaho
Supreme Court's holding in Cope. In Cope, as here, the district court injected evidence
of the defendant's statements, and the evaluations based upon those statements, both
at sentencing itself and in the presentence investigation report. Cope, 142 ldaho at
495, 129 P.3d at 1244. The Court in Cope held that:
Cope's statements to the psychiatrist for purposes of the competency
evaluation should not have been used. They did not fall under the limited
exception allowing use for impeachment.

Id. at 499. 129 P.3d at 1248.

This holding is consistent with the language of I.C. 3 18-215 itself. The limited
exception for impeachment provided by this statute expressly states that the
admissibility of this evidence is, "subject to the usual rules of evidence governing
matters of impeachment." I.C.

3 18-215. It is well established that the rules of evidence

are applicable to trial proceedings, but they do not apply to sentencing. See, e.g.,
Stafe v. Hoover, 138 ldaho 414, 422, 64 P.3d 340, 348 (Ct. App. 2003); I.R.E. 101(b),
(e)(3).

Reading this provision in context, it is clear that the narrow impeachment

exception provided is limited to the circumstance of impeachment of the defendant at
trial.
Finally, as noted in the Appellant's Brief, this error was not harmless. While the
State attempts to cast the harmlessness test as whether the district court considered
other factors that were proper at sentencing, the actual test as articulated by the ldaho
Supreme Court in Cope is whether the improper admission and consideration of
competency evaluations "infected the sentence." Cope, 142 ldaho at 500, 129 P.3d at
1249.
The sentence in Cope was deemed harmless largely because there was ample
information presented to the district court from sources unrelated to the competency
evaluation that informed the district court regarding the mental health issues suffered by
the defendant. Cope, 142 ldaho at 500-502, 129 P.3d at 1249-1251. This included
materials regarding prior involuntary psychiatric commitments that were provided by the
defense and the testimony provided by the defense's own mental health expert at
sentencing. Id. In this case, unlike Cope, there was no other source of information
regarding Mr. Jockumsen's mental illnesses and conditions that was not fatally infected

with information taken directly from the competency evaluations. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.11-12.) As such, it cannot be said that the sentence receive by Mr. Jockurnsen,
which was in part predicated on this improper information, was harmless.

The Proper Standard For Review Of Whether The District Court Was Required To Sua
Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencinq Incorporates
The Requirements Of Both I.C.R. 32(D) And I.C. 5 19-2522
To the extent that the State appears to argue that consideration of the mandatory
requirements of I.C. 19-2522 is not a part of the analysis for manifest disregard in the
context of the failure of a court to sua sponfe order a mental health evaluation, and that
only compliance with I.C.R. 32, without any reference to I.C. 19-2522, is the standard of
review, this argument has already been considered and rejected by the Court of
Appeals in the recent decision of State v. Durham, 146 ldaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723,
726 (Ct. App. 2008). And, there was good reason for the Durham court's rejection of
this assertion.
Generally, when a statute and a court rule deal with the same subject matter and
share a common purpose, this Court reads the two provisions in conjunction with one
another. The case law regarding the sua sponte duty of the district court reflects this
principle through analyzing the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d) in conjunction with I.C.

5 19-

2522. Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845. See also Collins, 144 ldaho at 409,
162 P.3d at 788; Sfafe v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 881, 876 P.2d 158, 163 (Ct. App.
1994); State v. Pearson, 108 ldaho 889, 890-892, 702 P.2d 927, 928-930 (Ct. App.
1985). This Court similarly reads statutes and ldaho court rules in conjunction with one
another in other contexts involving criminal trials or sentencing where the statute and

the court rule deal with the same subject matter. See, e.g., Murillo v. Sfafe, 144 ldaho
449, 452, n.l, 163 P.3d 238, 241 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing co-extensive right to an
interpreter in both statute and court rule); State v. Dorsey, 139 ldaho 149, 150-51, 75
P.3d 203, 204-205 (Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing legal sufficiency of an information as
being governed by both statute and court rule); State v. Pole, 139 ldaho 370, 372, 79
P.3d 729, 731 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing to both statute and court rule for standards of
probable cause hearing). Other jurisdictions also explicitly hold that statutes and court
rules that deal with a common subject matter or that have a common purpose are to be
read together to give effect to both. See, e.g., People v. Priest, 803 NE.2d 181, 185
(III.Ct. App. 2003); Cooper v. Sacco, 745 A.2d 1074, 1077 (Md. 2000). This is also in
accord with Idaho's well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes relating
to the same subject matter are to be construed together. See, e.g., Stafe v. Callaghan,
143 ldaho 856,858,153 P.3d 1202,1204 (Ct. App. 2006).
I.C.R. 32(d) provides in relevant part that the decision as to whether to order a
psychological evaluation is to be made by the sentencing judge. While it is within the
discretion of the district court to order a psychological evaluation for purposes of
sentencing, the legislature has placed constraints on the proper exercise of that
discretion through enacting I.C.

9 19-2522.

with the same subject matter:

Criminal Rule 32(d) and I.C. § 19-2522 deal

the district court's duty to order a mental health

evaluation for purposes of setting an appropriate sentence. The court rule and the
statute also share a common purpose:

to ensure that the district court has the

necessary information before it regarding potential mental conditions of the defendant

that are relevant in fashioning the appropriate sentence. As such, these two provisions
should be read in conjunction with one another.
Here, the specific provisions of I.C. (j 19-2522 clarify that the district court is
under an independent duty to order a psychological evaluation where it is likely that the
defendant's mental condition will be a substantial factor at sentencing and for good
cause shown. Courts interpreting the duty of the district court to order a mental health
evaluation sua sponte focus directly on the mandatory language included in I.C. (j 192522. See Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845. It is the plain language of
I.C. (j 19-2522 stating that the district court "shall appoint" a psychiatrist or psychologist
to obtain a mental health evaluation, read in conjunction with the provisions of I.C.R.
32(d), that creates an independent duty on the part of the court to order a mental health
evaluation under certain circumstances. State v. Coonts, 137 ldaho 150, 152-153, 44
P.3d 1205, 1207-1208 (Ct. App. 2002). In fact, the court in Coonts appears to root the
sua sponte duty of the district court to order a mental health evaluation entirely in the
mandatory language of I.C. (j 19-2522, finding that "frustrations with defense counsel's
lack of diligence do not, however, excuse the trial court from compliance with I.C. (j 192522." Id. at 153.44 P.3d at 1208.
As stated by the court in Craner, "The legal standards governing the court's
decision whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in
I.C. (j 19-2522." Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845; see also Collins, 144 ldaho
at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. Moreover, if there was sufficient evidence before the district
court to determine that the defendant's mental condition would be a factor at
sentencing, and the information before the district court does not satisfy the

requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, this constitutes a manifest disregard of the provisions of
I.C.R. 32(d). Craner, 137 ldaho at 190-191, 45 P.3d at 846-847. This is in accord with
other decisions interpreting the provisions of I.C. 3 19-2522(3) as providing the specific
content to which a psychological report must conform to be within the proper exercise of
the court's discretion under I.C.R. 32(d). See, e.g., Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d
at 788; McFarland, 125 ldaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163; Pearson, 108 ldaho at 890-892,
702 P.2d at 928-930. Applying the relevant case law, the question of compliance with
the provisions of I.C. § 19-2522 is inextricably intertwined with the analysis regarding
whether the district court acted in manifest disregard of the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d).
The relevant legal standards considered by this Court when examining whether
the district court abused its discretion in failing to sua sponfe order a psychological
evaluation are those contained in I.C.R. 32(d) and I.C. Cj 19-2522. The relevant case
law articulating these standards has consistently read these provisions together based
on the fact that they are in pari maferia. The determination of whether the district court
acted in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32(d) is made in reference to whether there is good
cause to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a substantial factor at
sentencing and whether the information before it meets the requirements of I.C. § 192522(3). Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. As such, in reviewing whether the
district court in this case abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a
mental health evaluation, this Court should read I.C.R. 32(d), I.C.
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19-2522, and the

case law interpreting the interplay of these provisions together in making the
determination of whether the district court abused its discretion.

The State in this case makes no argument that the materials that were properly
before the district court met with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. As argued in the
Appellant's Brief, there was every reason to believe that Mr. Jockumsen's mental health
would be a significant factor at sentencing; and it was, in fact, a central focus of the
district court. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-24.) However, the materials properly before the
district court failed to address nearly all of the critical factors that were statutorily
required pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522(3). (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-24.) As such, the
district court's failure to sua sponfe order a mental health evaluation constituted
manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jockumsen respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing after a complete evaluation of his mental
health conditions is made in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32. Further, he
requests that this Court remand his case to the district court with instructions to order a
new PSI that omits the contents and conclusions of his competency evaluations and
also instruct the district court to forward the new PSI to the Department of Correction.
In the alternative, he asks that this Court reverse the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 7" day of October, 2009.
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